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Abstract 
The German government maintains programs providing financial support for the rehabilitation of 
buildings with the aim of reducing energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the building 
sector. Lately, these programs have received additional attention for three reasons: First, the 
government’s new Energy Concept from 2010 incorporates a substantial expansion of building 
rehabilitation activities. Second, the programs have been used as a tool for macroeconomic 
stabilization in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Third, the government is concerned about 
the public deficit and all kinds of public expenditure are coming under increasing scrutiny. 
The aim of our paper is to contribute to a fact-based discussion of the costs and benefits of the 
building rehabilitation program. We develop an extended input-output model (STEIN) to estimate the 
macroeconomic effects of the rehabilitation measures that received funding and how they affect the 
public deficit, focusing on the revenue from income taxes and social security contributions (SSC) as 
well as taxes on products and production. Our findings indicate that the programs induce substantial 
public revenue mainly through income taxes and SSC which have to be weighed against the program 
cost. We also estimate the distribution of public cost and public revenue between different levels of 
government (national level, federal state level and municipality level). If the rehabilitation measures 
do not crowd out other investment projects, the net effect on the public deficit turns out to be 
positive. 
 
                                                          
* This paper is partly based on a project commissioned by KfW Bankengruppe. 
†
 Corresponding author. E-Mail: t.kronenberg@fz-juelich.de. Phone: +49 2461 61 1721. 
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1 Introduction 
Measures for the reduction of energy consumption and the associated CO2 emissions in the building 
sector have been on the political agenda for a number of years. In order to support efforts of private 
and public building owners, KfW Bankengruppe (a state-owned banking group, henceforth simply 
“KfW”) has been promoting investment projects that contribute to energy saving and CO2 reduction. 
These activities aim at a crucial element of the Federal Government’s energy strategy announced in 
the fall of 2010 [BMWi, 2010]. With the decision to speed up the pace of nuclear energy phase-out, 
the contribution of the building sector to further energy efficiency and climate protection has gained 
additional importance [BMWi, 2011]. The efficiency standards for buildings are to be increased 
further, and by means of the Energieeinsparverordnung (energy saving directive, henceforth “EnEV”) 
the standards for new buildings are to approach gradually the future European standard of “lowest 
energy buildings” until 2020, taking into consideration the economic burdens imposed on building 
owners and tenants. Funding for the energetic rehabilitation of buildings is to be increased by 1.5 
billion EUR per year for 2012 to 2014, and the scope of the allowance for depreciation in the building 
sector is to be increased as well. Furthermore, the government will try to find by 2015 a solution that 
does not burden the public budgets through promotional programs, for example environmental 
economic instruments like “white certificates” [BMWi, 2011]. 
The evaluations of the KfW programs in this area for the years 2005 to 2009 have come up with 
positive results with respect to investment stimulation, energy saving, CO2 reduction and 
employment effects [Clausnitzer et al., 2010, Clausnitzer et al., 2007, Clausnitzer et al., 2008, Gabriel 
& Balmert, 2007], but also with regard to the effects on the public budgets [Kuckshinrichs et al., 
2010b, Kuckshinrichs et al., 2010a]. For the years 2008 to 2010, KfW has adjusted its promotion 
policy to the altered framework conditions, for example by procuring funding support for the 
construction of new buildings. The evaluation of the adjusted programs and their effects on the 
public budgets is yet forthcoming. 
The goal of this study is to provide an analysis of the effects of KfW programs in the area of energy 
efficiency and CO2 reduction on the public budgets for the years 2008 to 2010. The analysis focuses 
on the short-term effects, i.e. the effects taking place in the corresponding year. To this end, the 
program cost are reported in combination with the additional revenue (and avoided spending) for 
the various types of taxes and deductions, and are allocated to the various administrative levels 
(municipality, state, and federal level) as well as the social security systems. For the year 2008, the 
analysis covers the four programs “CO2 building rehabilitation”, “Ecological construction”, “KfW 
municipal loans – energy-efficient rehabilitations” and “Social investment – energy-saving building 
rehabilitation”. The analysis for the funding years 2009 and 2010 covers the following four KfW 
programs: “Energy-efficient construction”, “Energy-efficient rehabilitation”, “Energy-efficient 
rehabilitation – municipalities” and “Social investment– energy-saving building rehabilitation”. 
2 Motivation 
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany has announced in its “Energy Concept” that it 
aims at reducing German CO2 emissions by 80% in 2050, compared to the base year 1990. This is a 
highly ambitious goal. Between 1990 and 2010, annual CO2 emissions have fallen from 1,042 Mt to 
832 Mt, an average growth rate of -1.1% per year. If emissions continue to decline at this rate, they 
will reach a level of around 500 Mt in 2050, resulting in a reduction of about 50% compared to 1990. 
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In order to reach the goal of an 80% reduction, emissions must grow from now on at a rate of -3.4% 
per year. The different time paths of German CO2 emissions are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Past and future CO2 emissions 
 
Source: Destatis, authors’ calculations 
As evidenced in Figure 1, the task ahead is not easy. In order to increase the chances of achieving the 
stated objective, it makes sense to determine the areas where current emissions come from and how 
they can be reduced with the (now or soon) available technological options. 
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Figure 2: CO2 emissions by industry and households, 2008 
 
Source: Destatis, authors’ calculations 
Figure 2 shows the structure of (direct) CO2 emissions in Germany by industry and private 
households. Clearly, the most important sector is the production and distribution of energy and 
water, which accounts for 42% of total CO2 emissions. The second-most important sector is that of 
private households, which were responsible for 22% of total emissions. These figures refer to direct 
emissions of CO2. In other words, the emissions allocated to private households are the emissions 
that are caused when consumers burn fossil fuels to heat their homes or drive their cars. The 42% of 
emissions allocated to “energy and water” are mostly caused by utilities burning fossil fuels to 
produce electricity and steam heat. 
The Federal Government has deduced from these figures that a reduction of total CO2 emissions by 
the desired magnitude must focus on two central issues: the use of energy for heating purposes in 
buildings and the shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy carriers in the electricity sector. These 
two pillars – increased energy efficiency and a larger share of renewable electricity – feature very 
prominently in the government’s Energy Concept. For each of these pillars, appropriate policy 
instruments have to be implemented. The second pillar, the production of electricity, is targeted by 
the Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), which promotes the installation of 
wind turbines and other renewable electricity installations by means of guaranteed feed-in tariffs. 
The first pillar, energy efficiency in buildings, is targeted by a variety of policy instruments. The 
Energy Saving Regulation (Energieeinsparverordnung, EnEV), for example, imposes technological 
standards which must be fulfilled by newly constructed buildings. However, many of the currently 
existing buildings will in all likelihood still be occupied in 2050, the target year of the Energy Concept. 
In order to ensure a reduction of energy consumption in those buildings, the government has 
decided to promote the rehabilitation of such buildings. A central instrument in this respect is the 
CO2 rehabilitation program, on which we focus in this paper. 
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3 KfW Promotional Programs for CO2 Reductions in Buildings 
KfW programs designed to improve energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions in the building sector 
promote investments in energy-saving measures and the reduction of CO2, whether in the 
construction of new homes or in the refurbishment of housing and buildings that form part of the 
public and social infrastructure. The Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development 
(BMVBS) provides budget resources to KfW for low interest loans and for investment grants. In April 
2009 the “Energy-efficient refurbishment” program superseded the programs “CO2 building 
rehabilitation program – loan and grant variants” and “Housing modernization – Eco-Plus variant”. 
This program serves to promote comprehensive refurbishment into “KfW efficiency houses” or 
individual measures to improve energy efficiency. As well as repayment bonuses dependent on the 
primary energy consumption of the efficiency house, a special promotion is possible if construction is 
supervised by an external technical expert. 
The former “Ecological construction” program was superseded by the “Energy-efficient construction” 
program in April 2009. This promotes the construction and initial purchase of “KfW efficiency 
houses”. It can also be used to promote the conversion of existing buildings and replacing new 
buildings into energy-efficient new buildings. The KfW loan will assume 100 % of construction costs 
(without the costs of the property) up to a maximum of EUR 50,000 per housing unit. 
As for non-residential housing, the KfW programs “Energy-efficient refurbishment – municipalities” 
and “Social investment program – energy-saving building refurbishment” promote measures to 
improve the energy-efficiency of buildings that form part of the municipal and social infrastructure. 
Since 2008, low-interest KfW loans have been available to municipalities and non-profit-making 
organizations for energy-efficient refurbishment. 
Table 1 shows the basic data for the funding years 2008-2010 of the programs examined [IEK-STE 
(Forschungszentrum Jülich), 2011]. The program costs are covered by the federal government budget 
and, at around EUR 1,300 million in 2008 and almost EUR 1,400 million in 2010, are nearly the same 
amount in these two years. In 2009 approximately 50 % more was provided in federal funds, some 
EUR 2,000 million. As part of the federal government’s economic stimulus package (Konjunkturpaket 
I), these funds were part of an economic policy designed to mitigate the downturn in the wake of the 
financial crisis [IEK-STE (Forschungszentrum Jülich), 2011]. 
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Table 1: Basic data on KfW programs (Mio. €) 
  2008 2009 2010 
  
Credit 
Volume 
Induced* 
[Promoted*] 
Investment 
Induced* 
[Promoted*] 
Jobs 
Program 
costs 
Credit 
Volume 
Induced* 
[Promoted*] 
Investment 
Induced* 
[Promoted*] 
Jobs 
Program 
costs 
Credit 
Volume 
Induced* 
[Promoted*] 
Investment 
Induced* 
[Promoted*] 
Jobs 
Program 
costs 
  Million € Million €   Million € Million € Million €   Million € Million € Million €   Million € 
CO2 building 
rehabilitation 
3,104 3,394 
[3,394] 
51,000 
[51,000] 
  - - -   - - - 
 KfW municipal 
loans – refurb. 
80 125 
[125] 
1,878
1)
 
[1878]
1)
 
  - - -   - - - 
 Social inv. – 
energy-saving 
refurbishment 
10 14 
[14] 
210
1)
 
[210]
1)
 
  - - -   - - - 
 Energy-efficient 
refurbishment 
- - -   5,769 7,761 
[7,761] 
124,000 
[124,000] 
  5,092 7,042 
[7,042] 
113,000 
[113,000]   
Energy-efficient 
infrastructures 
- - -   152 229 
[229] 
4,000 
[4,000] 
  114 205 
[205] 
3,000 
[3,000] 
 Total 
refurbishment 
3,194 3,533 
[3,533] 
53,089
1)
 
[53,089]
1)
 
  5,921 7,990 
[7,990] 
128,000 
[128,000] 
  5,206 7,247 
[7,247] 
116,000 
[116,000]   
Inv./Credit   1,11       1,35       1,39     
Ecological 
building 
2,389 2,643
1)
  
[8,648] 
39,708 
1)
 
[137,911]
1)
 
  - - -   - - - 
 Energy-efficient 
construction 
- - -   3,094 4,175
1)
  
[10,607] 
66,886
1)
  
 [170,000] 
  3,654 5,087
1)
  
 [14,288] 
81,418
1)
  
 [229,000] 
 Inv./Credit  1.11
1) 
 
[3.62]  
    1.35
1)
 
[3.43] 
    1.39
1)
 
[3.91] 
 
 Total refurb. & 
construction 
5,583 6,176
1)
 
[12,181] 
92,797
1)
 
[191,000] 
1,293 9,015 12,165
1)
 
[18,597] 
194,886
1)
 
[298,000] 
2,035 8,860 12,334
1)
 
[21,535] 
[197,418]
1)
 
[345,000] 
1,366 
*: promoted by provision of KfW funds; induced in the sense of directly initiated by KFW funds 
1): Data adjusted by the authors 
Source: [KfW, 2011a, KfW, 2011b, KfW, 2011c, Clausnitzer et al., 2009, Clausnitzer et al., 2010], own conversion 
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4 Modelling Approach 
In order to estimate the macroeconomic impact of the investment projects that were undertaken 
with KfW support, we employ the STEIN model. An extensive description of STEIN can be found 
elsewhere [Kuckshinrichs et al., 2009, Kuckshinrichs et al., 2010b]. In the following, we provide 
merely a brief outline of the model’s central features. For a general introduction to input-output 
modeling, we recommend the textbook by Miller and Blair [Miller & Blair, 2009]. 
The core of STEIN is a static open input-output quantity model. It is “static” in the sense that 
investment does not react to changes in demand, output, or capacity utilization, so the “accelerator 
mechanism”, which arises when investment reacts to those variables, is not part of the model. It is 
also “open” in the sense that consumption expenditure by households is also treated as exogenous, 
so there is no “income multiplier”. In other words, all components of final demand (consumption 
expenditure by households, consumption expenditure by government, investment, and exports) are 
considered exogenous variables (“autonomous demand”, in Keynesian terms). Finally, it can be 
described as a “quantity” model because it measures all variables in “real” (i.e. price-adjusted) terms. 
For example, if the model reports a 10% increase in the production of coal, this means that the 
production of coal has in fact increased by 10% (measured in tons, cubic meters, or some other 
physical unit), and the model does not make any statements about the price of coal. 
The reason for choosing a model without a multiplier-accelerator mechanism was that some 
participants in the policy arena doubt the existence of such mechanisms or claim that they are of 
negligible magnitude. Notwithstanding the existence of an enormous number of papers arguing that 
such effects do exist and are of significant magnitudes, it was decided to leave them outside the 
model at this stage. This means that the model results are on the “conservative” side in the sense 
that they represent a lower bound. If we included the multiplier-accelerator mechanism in the 
model, the estimated effects on sectoral production (and GDP, and employment, and public revenue) 
would be larger. 
The core of the model is the well-known equation 
 (1)       , 
where   denotes the vector of output by branch,   denotes the matrix of input-output coefficients, 
and   denotes the vector of final demand. Since STEIN is based on the latest input-output table 
provided by the Federal Statistical Office [Destatis, 2010], it distinguished 70 (groups of) products 
and 70 homogeneous branches. This means that   and   are column vectors of length 70, and   is a 
70 x 70 matrix. 
Solving (1) for   yields: 
 (2)           . 
The term         is the “Leontief inverse”.   can be computed from the official input-output 
tables and is henceforth assumed to be constant. Thus, (2) can be used to compute output by branch 
as a function of final demand by product. 
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As is common in the input-output approach, we consider the spending associated with the 
investment projects supported by the aforementioned KfW programs as an exogenous final demand 
impulse. That is, the vector   represents the demand for construction services for the completion of 
these projects. (2) can the then be used to estimate the effects of these projects on output  . So far, 
this is a fairly common application of a simple input-output model. 
Figure 3: Causal chains from demand impulse to public budgets 
 
Source: authors’ illustration 
The more interesting part of the model deals with the effect of the investment projects on public 
revenue. Figure 3 shows how the causal chains from the demand impulse to the net effect on the 
public budgets are represented in the model. The first step is the calculation of sectoral output. This 
is the “classic” application of input-output analysis described by equation (2). The second step is the 
estimation of the amount of public revenue induced by the change in sectoral output. Net taxes on 
products and net taxes on production are modeled as constant proportions of output in each branch 
(the factors of proportion can be computed from the input-output table). With respect to factor 
income, a distinction is made between the compensation of employees (gross wages plus social 
contributions, which can be interpreted as the reward for labor services) and net operating surplus 
(profits, rents, and interest, which can be interpreted as the reward for capital services if land and 
other natural resources form a sub-category of “capital”). Using data from the public sector accounts 
published by Destatis, we computed the average tax rates on these two types of factor income and 
assumed that they remain constant. All in all, STEIN covers more 99% of all tax income (with the 
remainder consisting mostly of inheritance tax revenue). For more details, see Kuckshinrichs et al. 
[Kuckshinrichs et al., 2010b]. 
A further objective of this study was to estimate the distribution of the additional revenue over the 
administrative levels and the social security system. In the German tax system, a distinction is made 
between federal taxes (Bundessteuern), Länder taxes (Landessteuern), and municipality taxes 
(Gemeindesteuern). The revenue from these taxes goes to the corresponding administrative layer. 
Demand impulse
Investment in construction and rehabilitation
Sectoral output
Net taxes on products,
Net taxes on production
Factor income Employment
Income tax,
social contributions
Net impact on public budgets
Additional revenue from taxes and social contributions
Reduced spending due to unemployment
(Avoided) cost of
unemployment
“classic“ IOA x = (I – A)-1 f
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Furthermore, there are “combined taxes” (Gemeinschaftssteuern). The revenue from those taxes is 
distributed over the administrative layers according to certain rules fixed by law. For example, a 
share of 42.5% of the revenue from income and wage taxes is distributed to the Federation, another 
42.5% goes to the Land, and the remaining 15% benefit the municipality. Other examples of 
Gemeinschaftssteuern are the corporate income tax (Federation and Länder receive 50% of the 
revenue) and the value added tax (the Federation receives 53.9%, the Länder receive 44.1%, and the 
municipalities receive 2% of the revenue). The distribution of the various types of taxes was included 
in the STEIN model by means of a distribution matrix (Table 2). 
Table 2: Distribution of revenue over administrative layers and social security 
 Federation Länder Municipalities Social security 
Value added tax 0.514 0.464 0.022  
Net taxes on products 0.444 0.060 0.496  
Net taxes on production 0.444 0.060 0.496  
Taxes on income     
   Payroll tax 0.425 0.425 0.150  
   Other income taxes 0.425 0.425 0.150  
   Capital returns tax 0.440 0.440 0.120  
   Corporate income tax 0.500 0.500 0.000  
   Solidarity surcharge 1.000    
Social contributions    1.000 
Source: authors’ calculations 
Another potentially important channel works through the (avoided) cost of unemployment. If an 
investment project induces a certain demand for additional labor, it is not immediately clear how 
that demand will be satisfied. Depending on the overall macroeconomic environment and certain 
labor market characteristics, firms may decide to make their employees work longer hours, but they 
may also decide to hire additional workers. A mixture of longer hours and more employees is also 
possible (and perhaps the most likely case). A simple input-output model can compute the induced 
labor demand, but it cannot say whether this demand will be met by longer hours or additional 
employment. 
In order to account for both possibilities, we compute two different scenarios. The first one, which 
we call “overtime”, is based on the assumption that the demand impulse does not generate any 
additional jobs, and the induced labor demand is met entirely by workers working overtime. In the 
second scenario, which is labeled “jobs”, the opposite is true – for each additional man-year of labor 
demand, an additional job is created. Naturally, this has a dramatic effect on public budgets. In the 
scenario “overtime”, the state receives additional revenue from income taxes (assuming that the 
additional hours are paid) and social contributions (which are linked to gross income), but since the 
number of unemployed workers is unaffected, spending on unemployment benefit and other 
unemployment-related cost items is unaffected as well. In the scenario “jobs”, by contrast, the 
number of unemployed persons decreased, and so does the cost of unemployment. 
These additional effects are considered in the model by drawing on a related study by the Institute of 
Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). The IAB concluded that, 
when all effects are considered, the “fiscal cost of unemployment” amounts to roughly 18.000 Euro 
per person and year, although this has fluctuated between the years [Bach & Spitznagel, 2008]. We 
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adopt that figure and, based on the employment figures (Table 1), compute the avoided cost of 
unemployment for the scenario “jobs”. 
5 Results 
Table 3 reports the model results in terms of the effects on the (overall) public budgets. The first row 
shows the program cost, i.e. the opportunity cost of providing funds for the KfW promotional 
programs instead of using them elsewhere. The other rows show the estimated return in terms of tax 
revenue and SSC. For each of the two scenarios, the net total is displayed in bold type. 
Table 3: Effects on public budgets induced by investment projects (million €) 
  2008 2009 2010 
Program cost 1,293 2,035 1,366 
Value added tax paid by investors 1,173 
[2,314] 
2,313 
[3,536] 
2,343 
[4,091] 
Net taxes on products 94 
[185] 
185 
[283] 
188 
[328] 
Net taxes on production 76 
[150] 
149 
[228] 
151 
[264] 
Payroll tax and SSC incl. solidarity surcharge 1,167 
[2,302] 
2,273 
[3,475] 
2,282 
[3,984] 
Corporate income tax and other income taxes incl. 
solidarity surcharge 
261 
[515] 
441 
[674] 
388 
[677] 
Scenario “overtime”: total 1,478 
[4,173] 
3,326 
[6,161] 
3,987 
[7,978] 
Avoided cost of unemployment 857 
[1,764] 
1,800 
[2,752] 
1,823 
[3,186] 
Scenario “jobs”: total 2,335 
[5,937] 
5,126 
[8,913] 
5,810 
[11,164] 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The results of our calculations clearly show that the public revenue resulting from the investment 
projects is substantial. In 2008, for example, the program cost amount to 1,293 million €, which were 
employed to pay out a credit volume amount to 5,583 million € (cf. Table 1), which in turn was used to 
finance investment projects worth 12,181 million € (of which 6,176 million € were “induced” in our 
terminology). In the scenario “overtime”, the “induced” investment projects generated 1,173 million € of 
revenue from VAT, 94 million € of revenue from net taxes on products, 76 million € of revenue from net 
taxes in production, 1,167 million € of revenue from payroll tax and SSC (including solidarity 
surcharge) and 261 million € of revenue from corporate income tax and other income taxes 
(including solidarity surcharge). The “net effect” (public revenue minus program cost) was 1,478 
million €. In the scenario “jobs”, the avoided cost of unemployment amounts to 857 million €, so the 
net effect on the public budget is 2,335 million €. When all investments are considered, the 
corresponding figures are significantly larger (but again, we emphasize that those investments which 
fell outside the promotional range cannot be considered “induced”). 
For the year 2009, all figures are substantially higher, because that is precisely the year of the “Great 
Recession” when the KfW promotional programs were specifically used as a means to increase 
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aggregate demand. For 2010, the public revenue figures are similar in magnitude to those for 2009, 
whereas the program cost is significantly lower. We suspect that this has to do with the reduced cost 
of borrowing from the government’s point of view, which means that the opportunity cost of 
providing funds for the programs was lower in 2010 than in earlier years. 
Another point of interest is the distribution of additional revenue over the different administrative 
levels and the social security system. This is shown in Table 4. The program cost is a cost item from 
the Federation’s point of view. This means that even after taking account of all the revenue effects, 
the net effect on the federal budget is negative in many cases. Exceptions are the year 2010 (when 
the ratio of program cost to credit volume and induced investment fell significantly) and the 
optimistic “jobs” scenario for 2009. For the other administrative levels, the effect on their budgets is 
clearly positive, as they do not have to bear the program cost while receiving part of the induced 
revenue. The Länder benefit tremendously from the induced VAT revenue (they receive almost 50% 
of total VAT revenue); roughly two thirds of their additional revenue comes from this source. From 
the municipalities’ point of view, all tax channels are important. The social security system, naturally, 
benefits mostly from additional SSC. For social security, the difference between the two scenarios is 
striking: the net effect in the “jobs” scenario is almost twice as large as in the “overtime” scenario. 
The reason for this is that the avoided cost of unemployment – in the case of unemployed workers 
getting employed due to the investment spending – consists to a large extent of avoided payments of 
unemployment benefit. 
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Table 4: Effect on the budgets of different administrative layers and social security (million €) 
 2008 2009 2010 
 F L M S Total F L M S Total F L M S Total 
Program cost 1,293 0 0 0 1,293 2,035 0 0 0 2,035 1,366 0 0 0 1,366 
Value added tax 603 
[1,189] 
 
544 
[1,073] 
 
26 
[51] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
1,173 
[2,313] 
1,188 
[1,816] 
1072 
[1,639] 
 
52 
[79] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
2,312 
[3,534] 
1,204 
[2,102] 
 
1,087 
[1,898] 
52 
[91] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
2,343 
[4,091] 
 Net taxes on products 50 
[99] 
 
11 
[22] 
 
34 
[67] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
94 
[188] 
 
84 
[128] 
 
15 
[23] 
 
87 
[133] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
186 
[284] 
 
83 
[145] 
 
11 
[19] 
 
93 
[162] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
188 
[326] 
 Net taxes on production 40 
[79] 
 
9 
[18] 
 
27 
[53] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
76 
[150] 
 
68 
[104] 
 
12 
[18] 
 
69 
[105] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
149 
[227] 
 
67 
[117] 
 
9 
[16] 
 
75 
[131] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
151 
[264] 
 Payroll tax and SSC incl. 
solidarity surcharge 
143 
[282] 
 
126 
[248] 
 
45 
[89] 
 
853 
[1,682] 
 
1,167 
[2,301] 
268 
[410] 
 
236 
[361] 
 
84 
[128] 
 
1,685 
[2,576] 
2,274 
[3,475] 
263 
[459] 
 
233 
[407] 
 
82 
[143] 
 
1.704 
[2.975] 
2,282 
[3,984] 
 Corporate income tax and 
other income taxes incl. 
solidarity surcharge 
123 
[243] 
 
110 
[217] 
 
28 
[55] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
261 
[515] 
 
208 
[318] 
 
181 
[277] 
 
52 
[79] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
441 
[674] 
 
181 
[316] 
 
161 
[281] 
 
46 
[80] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
388 
[677] 
 
Scenario “overtime”: total -335 
[599] 
 
800 
[1,578] 
159 
[315] 
 
853 
[1,682] 
 
1,478 
[4,174] 
-219 
[741] 
 
1,517 
[2,318] 
344 
[524] 
 
1,685 
[2,576] 
3,328 
[6,159] 
433 
[1,773] 
 
1,501 
[2,621] 
348 
[607] 
1,704 
[2,975] 
3,987 
[7,976] 
 Avoided cost of 
unemployment 
139 
[286] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
139 
[286] 
 
579 
[1,192] 
857 
[1,764] 
 
292 
[446] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
292 
[446] 
 
1,216 
[1,859] 
1,800 
[2,751] 
296 
[517] 
 
0 
[0] 
 
296 
[517] 
 
1,232 
[2,153] 
1,824 
[3,187] 
Scenario “jobs”: total -196 
[885] 
 
800 
[1,578] 
298 
[601] 
 
1,432 
[2,874] 
2,335 
[5,938] 
73 
[1,187] 
 
1,517 
[2,318] 
633 
[970] 
 
2,901 
[4,435] 
5,125 
[8,910] 
729 
[2,290] 
 
1,501 
[2,621] 
644 
[1,124] 
2,936 
[5,128] 
5,811 
[11,163] 
 F: Federation, L: Länder, M: Municipalities, S: Social security 
[  ]: due to promoted investment (not only induced) spending 
Due to rounding errors, column sums may deviate from figures in Table 3. 
     
Source: authors‘ calculations 
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6 Discussion 
Table 4 shows that the net effect – induced revenue minus program cost – is generally positive, in 
some cases even at the federal level. However, one should not interpret these findings in such a way 
as to conclude that the programs are self-financing. Under certain conditions, they may be. However, 
this depends very much on the macroeconomic environment, which may change considerably 
especially in highly uncertain times like, for example, 2008 and 2009. The model framework adopted 
in this study is basically a rather simple input-output model which takes final demand as an 
exogenous “trigger”. It does not consider possible crowding-out effects between the investment 
projects promoted by KfW and other investment projects. Furthermore, as a pure quantity model, it 
does not consider the possible effects of increased demand on commodity prices. 
On the other hand, we would argue that under the special conditions prevailing in 2008 to 2010, the 
KfW promotional programs were not likely to exhibit significant crowding-out or price effects. In 
those years, the macroeconomic problem was an oversupply of savings and a shortage of (safe) 
investment projects, not the other way around. This is evidenced by the development of real interest 
rates, which plunged to historically low levels (and, by the way, are still extremely low at the time of 
writing). Furthermore, the German economy of the 21st century is integrated into the capital markets 
of the Eurozone, the European Union, and the world as a whole. It is hard to imagine how investment 
spending of less than 10,000 million € per year could exert a significant effect on the real interest 
rates prevailing in those markets, so crowing-out via higher interest rates is simply not likely. 
Another question is that of windfall gains. Some investors may have been planning to undertake 
investment projects independently from KfW programs, and the additional spending on those 
projects may have formed a windfall gain for those investors without triggering any new investment 
spending. The extent of such effects is very hard to verify empirically, but their existence cannot be 
denied. This neglect could mean that our estimates are biased upward. On the other hand, we did 
not include macroeconomic feedback loops in the form of income multipliers or accelerator effects. 
Incorporating such effects would have led to higher results. Although ultimate proof is lacking, we 
would argue on the basis of economic intuition that the various upward and downward biases should 
cancel out each other on the whole, and the results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 are of a realistic 
magnitude. 
7 Conclusion 
The findings presented above show that the KfW promotional programs for CO2 reduction may 
contribute to more than one policy objective. Firstly, they result in significant reductions in energy 
use and emissions. This is beneficial from an environmental point of view, and it also helps to reduce 
the import dependence of an economy which is heavily dependent on manufacturing and relatively 
poor in domestic energy sources. Secondly, they strengthen the demand for labor-intensive activities 
such as construction services. Especially in times of economic crisis, this effect may generate or save 
a significant number of jobs in an economy which is still suffering from mass unemployment. Thirdly, 
the effect on the public budget is more complex than a superficial glance at the program cost figures 
may suggest. Clearly, the program cost cannot be ignored; as an opportunity cost it has to be taken 
under consideration by the corresponding authorities. However, it has to be juxtaposed against the 
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significant revenue in form of taxes and SSC as well as the avoided cost of unemployment that 
emerge from the increase in demand. 
This paper has focused on the case of Germany over the years 2008 to 2010. The question is what 
can be learned from this experience, especially upon consideration of the current economic climate 
in the European Union. We would argue that if European governments decide to shift away from 
fiscal austerity toward promoting growth from the demand side, they should consider implementing 
programs like those described in this paper. Especially the refurbishment of existing buildings might 
provide relief to troubled economies like Spain and Ireland because the multiplier effects are likely to 
be larger than for most other sectors, and because of this multiplier the net cost of such programs is 
significantly lower than some may think when looking only at the program cost. Aside from that, 
there is the environmental dividend in the form of reduced energy consumption and emissions, 
which may not be the case for many other investment projects. 
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